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The unexpected fall of Soviet Union left ethnic Russians, outside Russia with many
questions and concerns. Many of them emigrated to Russia from the erstwhile Soviet
Union, for better conditions there. The disintegration of Soviet Union – a state created on
the ideology of Communismwas one of the reasons, apart from economic, political, socio-
cultural, reasons besides the failure of Communism to keep the Soviet Union together
were the main causes of Russian out-migration from Central Asia. The out-migration of
Russians from Central Asia to Russia began in the 1970s as internal labour migration
shifted in the wake of better job opportunities. It accelerated tremendously after 1991,
and touched its highest mark in 1994, as a response to the relative economic prosperity of
Russia at that time. Thus the improved standard of living in Russia and the desire to
return to their cultural homeland were some major issues that concerned people to shift
to Russia.
Copyright  2013, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Between 1990 and 2003, Russia received more than 10
million people,1 of which more than half were ethnicer).
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autonomous status in Russia (Tatars, Bashkirs, etc.).2
Among Central Asian republics Tajikistan became the ﬁrst
to emigrate the ethnic Russians because of the difﬁcult
conditions caused by the Civil War there; followed by
Kyrgyzstan where the transition to a market economy
initiated by Bishkek impoverished rural areas resulted in a
considerable loss of the ethnic Russians.3 Disintegration of
the Union was the major reason itself for migration of
people from one area to other.43 Marlène Laruelle, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. V, No. III,
p. 104.
4 Valery Tishkov, Zhanna Zayinchkovskaya and Galina Vitkovskaya,
“Migration in the countries of the former Soviet Union”, A paper prepared
for the Policy Analysis and Research Programme of the Global Commis-
sion on International Migration, September 2005, p. 1, available online at
http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/main
site/policy_and_research/gcim/rs/RS3.pdf.
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Population change among Slavs in Central Asia, 1989–1996.
Population by nationality Change from 1989 to 1996
% Thousands % Total Of which
1989 1996 1989 1996 Net
increase
Net
migration
Uzbekistan 100.0 100.0 19,905 23,007 15.6 1102 3823 721
Russians 8.3 5.6 1653 1280 22.6 374 11 363
Ukrainians 0.8 0.6 153 134 12.6 19 2 17
Belarusians 0.1 0.1 29 22 24.8 7 0 8
Turkmenistan 100.0 100.0 3523 4198 19.2 675 687 12
Russians 9.5 6.6 334 278 16.8 56 1 55
Tajikistan 100.0 100.0 5109 5884 15.2 775 1040 266
Russians 7.6 3.4 388 199 48.9 190 2 188
Kyrgyzstan 100.0 100.0 4290 4545 5.9 255 626 371
Russians 21.4 15.6 917 707 22.8 209 10 41
Ukrainians 2.5 1.6 108 73 32.4 35 3 5
Belarusians 0.2 0.1 9 7 26.0 2 0 0
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Alone in 1990s more than half of the Russians out
migrated from Central Asia to Russia5 and by now more
than 4.5 million people have out migrated from Central
Asia6 and most of themwere Russians (70%).7 From 1989 to
2002 the number of those Central Asian nationals who
settled down in Russia legally and permanently rose from
882,000 to 963,000.8
Numerically Kazakhstan ranks highest in emigration of
non-natives in the entire Commonwealth of Independent
States.9 From Kazakhstan 728,000 Slavs left between 1989
and 199610 and by 2006 there were less than 4 million
Russians living there11 and many more, about 47.4%, were
willing to leave Kazakhstan.12 This out migration in Uzbe-
kistan was mostly of Slavs rather than of Russians as
300,000 Germans, left Kazakhstan in 1993.13
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan experienced large scale out-
migration of Russians as compared to the remaining
states of Central Asia.14 From Tajikistan almost 100,000
Russians left soon after February 199015 when in Dushanbe
violent confrontations occurred.16 By the end of 1992 some
150,000 Russian and other Russian speaking people
(Ukrainian, Korean, German) left Tajikistan.17 Before the
eruption of Civil War in Tajikistan, there were about half a
million Russian and Russian speakers in Tajikistan, but by
1996 only half of them remained.18 Tajik Civil War
compelled many Russians and other Europeans to emigrate5 The emigration of Russians was particularly high in the ﬁrst half of
the 1990s. And the émigrés were not only Russians but also other non-
indigenous minority groups of Central Asia. More than three-ﬁfth of the
Germen population, nearly two-ﬁfths of the Ukrainian and almost a
quarter of Poles also left Central Asia for their respective cultural nations;
Sebastien Peyrouse, “The Russian Minority in Central Asia: Migration,
Politics and Language”, Occasional Papers, Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., 2008, pp. 3–6.
6 Gulnara Mendikulova, “Problems and Perspectives of Migration dur-
ing the 20 years of Independent Central Asia”, Paper Presented in Four
Day International Conference, “Globalisation and Eurasia: Changes and
Challenges”, from October 18–21, 2011, Centre of Central Asian Studies,
University of Kashmir, Srinagar p. 3. (Unpublished).
7 Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 95.
8 This number among Kazakhs (settled in Russia) increased from
636,000 to 654,000; among Uzbeks, from 97,000 to 123,000, and among
Tajiks from 38,000 to 120,000 people. Tajikistan had experienced the
highest proportional increase particularly due to the Tajik Civil War,
which lasted from 1992 until 1996; Marlène Laruelle, China and Eurasia
Forum Quarterly, Vol. V, No. III, pp. 103–104.
9 The emigration in Kazakhstan reached highest in 1994 with nearly
500,000 people leaving the country including 300,000 Russians; Sebas-
tien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, p. 3–6.
10 Between 1989 and 1996 the Russian population in Kazakhstan
declined by 9.8%, that is, 678,000 heads; Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities
and States in Central Asia, p. 94.
11 Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, p. 3.
12 Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 94.
13 Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 94.
14 Recording of United States Information Agency (USIA) Ofﬁce of
Research in Kazakhstan, alarming number of those who are in jobs are
reported non-payment of wages or joblessness; Ajay Patnaik, Nations,
Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 101.
15 Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 94.
16 Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, p. 5.
17 Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 94.
18 Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 94.out of its fear and as a result Russians who contributed 7.6%
(388,000) in 1989 in Tajikistan were mere 1.1% (68,200)
by 2000.19
The number of Russians in Kyrgyzstan fell from 916,500
in 1989 to 720,000 in 1995.20 This number further
decreased to 603,000 in 1999 and to approximately
500,000 in 2006.21 Between 1990 and 1994, 200,000 Rus-
sians out-migrated from Kyrgyzstan.22 Here the primary
reason for the out-migration was economic because a sig-
niﬁcant number of Russians worked there in agriculture.23
Following table expresses the situation that arose in Central
Asia from 1990 onwards.Kazakhstan 100.0 100.0 16,536 16,544 0.0 8 1321 1313
Russians 37.7 33.9 6228 5615 9.8 613 62 678
Ukrainians 5.4 4.8 896 797 11.0 99 7 100
Belarusians 1.1 1.0 183 167 8.6 16 4 12
Source: Tim Heleniak, “The Changing Nationality Composition of the
Central Asia and Transcaucasian states”, Post-Soviet Geography and Eco-
nomics, Vol. XXXVIII, No. VI, 1997, pp. 369–375.Uzbekistan alone lost 170,000 Russians in 1992–1993
and 200,000 in 1993–1994.24 Between 1992 and 1996,
Central Asia accounted 59% of its net migrations to Russia,
of which 25% was from Uzbekistan alone.25
Turkmenistan in 1989 contained 9.5% Russians
(334,000) which in 1995 had shrank to 6.7% and in
2006 it had further decreased to just 2% of the total
population.2619 Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 95;
Sebastien Peyrouse has put their number in 2000 as 68,000 (1%);
Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, p. 5.
20 In Kyrgyzstan almost 100,000 Russians left in 1993 alone; Sebastien
Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, p. 6.
21 From 1991 to 2006 Kyrgyzstan alone lost 600,000 inhabitants of
which more than half were the ethnic Russians; Sebastien Peyrouse,
Occasional Papers, p. 4.
22 Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 98;
Between 1989 and 1991 150,000 Russians left the republic; Sebastien
Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, p. 4.
23 Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 99.
24 Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, p. 6.
25 Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, pp. 94–95.
26 Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, p. 5.
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There was internal conﬂict or rather inherent conﬂict in
thepolicies of USSR. SinceUSSRwas framed as an ideological
state based on non-religiosity of communism yet in spite of
vigorous campaignof the statemany times it failed. Similarly
Socialism based on Marxism could not develop the way it
should have as political order remained in few hands during
the 70 years of the life of the Union.27 Accordingly the
common people were not part of those who were the “de-
cision-makers” and social developments, therefore, were
found to be suffering as compared to the earlier years of the
history of the Union.28 It was also because the economic
depression was found in the Union after 1970s when eco-
nomic growthwas not at par with that of markets outside.29
This slide saw people ﬁnding it difﬁcult to stay in jobs they
were engagedearlier. Accordinglymany industries started to
become sick forcing professionals and labourers to shift from
one place to other30 giving rise tomigrationwithin the state.
There were many reasons for the disintegration of USSR
mostly because after the 1970s the Union could not keep
pace with the developmental process – a reality that was
achieved after the World War II.31 Besides the economic
failures the political structures also started to fail to live up
to the expectation of the people. The dissatisfactions of its
citizens,32 nationalist movements in Eastern Europe and
Asia,33 rivalry between power hungry political leaders,3427 Sean Sayers, “Marxism and actually existing Socialism”, University of
Kent, available online at http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/articles/
sayers/existingsocialism.pdf; Anders Åslund and Martha Brill Olcott,
“Russia After Communism”, available online at http://www.carnegieendow
ment.org/ﬁles/Russia_After_Communism_Intro.pdf.
28 The system of Socialism was an elite oriented towards militarism in
which common people were not given personal freedom. They were
treated like serfs and slaves as they were offered the necessities of food,
shelter, clothing, transportation and medical care but little else; Silicon
Valley and Tornado Alley, “The Economic Collapse of the Soviet Union”,
Department of Economics, San José State University, USA, available online
at http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/sovietcollapse.htm.
29 Victor Perlo, “The Economic and Political Crisis in the USSR”,
Marxism-Leninism Today, available online at http://mltoday.com/
essential-resources/us-classics/the-economic-and-political-crisis-in-the-
ussr-146.htm.
30 http://mltoday.com//index2.php?option¼com_content&do_pdf¼
1&id¼146.
31 Kathryn Stoner-Weiss and Michael McFaul, Domestic and Interna-
tional Inﬂuences on the Collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) and Russia’s
Initial Transition to Democracy (1993), Working Paper, No. 108, Center on
Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law Freeman Spogli Institute
for International Studies, March 2009, p. 4.
32 SenerAkturk, “15Years after the “Collapse” of Soviet Socialism: TheRole
of Elite Choices, Class Conﬂict, and a Critique of Modernization Theory”,
Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, Institute of Slavic, East
European, and Eurasian Studies, UC Berkeley, p. 14, 28, available online at
http://iseees.berkeley.edu/bps/publications/2008_02-akturk.pdf.
33 USSRexperienced a nationalistmobilization (nationalistmovements) in
the Baltic, the Transcaucasus, Ukraine and Moldova from 1989–1990; Mark
R. Beissinger, “Nationalism and the Collapse of Soviet Communism”,
Contemporary EuropeanHistoryContemporary EuropeanHistory, Vol.XVIII,
No. III, Cambridge University Press, Printed in the United Kingdom, 2009.
34 Dmitriy Gershenson and Herschel I. Grossman, “Cooption and
Repression in the Soviet Union”, Russell Sage Foundation Working Paper
#163, November 2000, p. 4, available online at http://www.russellsage.
org/sites/all/ﬁles/u4/Gershenson%20%26%20Grossman_Cooption%20and%
20Repression%20in%20the%20Soviety%20Union.pdf.etc. were other major reasons that facilitated the process
of disintegration.
Since the polity and administration was managed for
around 70 years by the same set of persons of the
Communist party,35 the political elite in many cases had
grown corrupt and thus inefﬁcient.36 It gave rise to rivalry,
dissension and animosity among the constituent republics
and their power hungry political leaders.37 Many of this
political leadership had not risen from the peoples directly
and accordingly initiatives taken for the country and people
were not always carried forward with enthusiasm. For
example Gorbachev’s political restructuring was not fully
supported by the Communist Party.38 The Party was
constantly putting pressure on the central leadership on
various accounts and this was one of the weakening factor
for the union government.39 Gorbachev sought to
modernize and streamline the Communist Party through
the introduction of his policies of “Glasnost” (openness)
and “Perestroika” (restructuring of economics and bringing
in social reform),40 but since his schemes failed to bring in
any substantial change in economic downfall of the country
thus the basic and fundamental reasons for Communism to
sustain became increasingly difﬁcult in the wake of West-
ern onslaught of market economy.41 The application of
Glasnost and Perestroika however brought certain impor-
tant socio-political changes, like Bukharin42 was set free
and declared innocent of all crimes, important political
events like the 19th Party Conference in 1988 and the ﬁrst
session of the new Congress of People’s Deputies in 1989
were televised,43 press was given freedom to publicize the
inefﬁciency and corruption which the government until35 Hukam Chand Jain and Krishna Chandra Mathur, A History of the
Modern World (1500-2000A.D.) (6th Ed), Jain Prakashan Mandir, Jaipur,
India, 2010, p. 531.
36 Dmitriy Gershenson and Herschel I. Grossman, “Cooption and
Repression in the Soviet Union”, Russell Sage Foundation Working Paper
#163, November 2000, pp. 4, 14–15, available online at http://www.
russellsage.org/sites/all/ﬁles/u4/Gershenson%20%26%20Grossman_
Cooption%20and%20Repression%20in%20the%20Soviety%20Union.pdf.
37 Robert Dodge, “Russia Repositions Itself Within Europe: Making A
Virtue Out If Necessity?”, available online at http://aei.pitt.edu/6480/1/
001311_1.PDF; http://www.answers.com/topic/union-of-soviet-socialist-
republics; www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-12406.html.
38 Peter J. Boettke, Why Perestroika Failed: The Politics and Economics of
Socialist Transformation, Routledge, New York, 1993, p. 76; Laura Cum-
mings, “Gorbachev’s Perestroika and the Collapse of the Soviet Union”,
available online at http://www.lagrange.edu/resources/pdf/citations/
2012/08_Cummings_History.pdf.
39 Peter J. Boettke, Why Perestroika Failed: The Politics and Economics of
Socialist Transformation, p. 43.
40 Gorbachev did not want to end Communism but to replace the
existing system (Stalinist) with a socialist one which was humane and
democratic in nature; Norman Lowe, Mastering Modern World History,
Macmillan Press Ltd., India, 1997, p. 333.
41 Peter J. Boettke, Why Perestroika Failed: The Politics and Economics of
Socialist Transformation, pp. 35, 55, 75–78.
42 Bukharinwas disgraced and executed in 1930s during the Stalin period;
Peter J. Boettke,Why Perestroika Failed: The Politics and Economics of Socialist
Transformation, p. 90; Grover Furr and Vladimir L. Bobrov, Stephen Cohen’s
Biography of Bukharin: A Study in the Falsehood of Khrushchev-Era “Revela-
tions” available online at http://clogic.eserver.org/2010/furr.pdf.
43 The secessionist stateswere encouragedby theanti-Communist powers
of theWest like America; HukamChand Jain andKrishna ChandraMathur,A
History of the Modern World (1500-2000A.D.) (6th Ed), p. 531.
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publicized to mobilize support for new policies.44 Such
political decisions were bold enough in a country where
everything was done inside the iron curtain. These moves
should virtually strengthen the government and so the
country but then there were outside factors which gave
ﬁllip to succession movements. One was that Communism
started to fail in Eastern Europe in late 80s on various ac-
counts45 – the main being the Soviet Union started to lose
control of this region because of her own inherent prob-
lems. Second was that after losing control in Eastern
Europe, the disintegration was given a serious thought by
Soviet leaders and as a result secession of Baltic States46
opened a way for other states to follow. The eagerness of
leaders like Boris Yeltsin to be supreme in Russia brokered
his power for disintegration of USSR.47 The constituent
republics thus became eager to attain the freedom and
became themselves Supremes – in Caucasus, Georgia,
Ukraine and in Central Asia.48
On the economic front, Soviet Union had built a new
economic order based on Socialism soon after its forma-
tion.49 This was further strengthened after theWorldWar II
as Soviet economy was badly hurt by the war.50 The war
also allowed Soviet Union to compete with US and literally
splitted the globe in two – the US camp based on Capitalism
and Soviet camp based on Socialism. Since there was war
between the two economies,51 the tightly controlled Soviet
economy was not able to compete with the free-market
economy of the Capitalist block. The western countries
made huge proﬁts by exploiting resources fromwhere ever
these were available, on the other hand Socialist block
remained conﬁned within its own boundaries and was lost
economically in that competition.52 When the Soviet
economy fell on hard times, they could no longer afford to
control their satellite countries in Asia and Eastern
Europe.53 The economic restructuring in the middle of
1980s was therefore because of these reasons and thus the
concept of state ownership of everyday economic sector44 Glasnost was encouraged provided nobody criticized the Party itself;
Peter J. Boettke, Why Perestroika Failed: The Politics and Economics of So-
cialist Transformation, pp. 13, 24.
45 Peter J. Boettke, Why Perestroika Failed: The Politics and Economics of
Socialist Transformation, p. 193.
46 Peter J. Boettke, Why Perestroika Failed: The Politics and Economics of
Socialist Transformation, pp. 2, 39.
47 Peter J. Boettke, Why Perestroika Failed: The Politics and Economics of
Socialist Transformation, p. 45.
48 en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dissolution_of_the_Soviet_Union.
49 David M. Kotz, “Sustaining Socialism: Lessons from the Soviet and
Chinese Experience”, paper was written for the Tenth Conference of
North American and Cuban Philosophers and Social Scientists, Havana,
Cuba, June 1998, p. 2.
50 http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/pons/s6_9143.pdf.
51 Julius K. Nyerere, “Ujamma – The Basis of African Socialism”, The
Journal of Pan African Studies, Vol. I, No. I, 1987, pp. 2–9, available online at
http://www.jpanafrican.com/edocs/e-DocUjamma3.5.pdf; J. V. Stalin,
Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, CPGB-ML (Marxists Internet
Archive), London, 1952, p. 36.
52 Peter J. Boettke, Why Perestroika Failed: The Politics and Economics of
Socialist Transformation, p. 47.
53 J. V. Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, CPGB-ML
(Marxists Internet Archive), London, 1952, pp. 11–18.began to change. From 1987 small-scale enterprises,54
providing services such as car or TV repairs, painting and
decorating, private tuitions, etc. and the co-operatives up to
the maximum number of 50 workers were allowed to be
operative at individual level on the basis of market forces.55
Although the main objective of this restructuring was to
increase the efﬁciency in the market as well as to provide
competition to the services provided by the state and to
provide alternative employment to the people, yet it was
also death blow to the ideology of Communism that failed
to produce the desired and expected standards of living
corresponding to the available resources as the economic
systems had grown inefﬁcient, over centralized and sub-
jected to too many restrictions.56 Additionally, in 1980s
people of USSR came in contact more with the West which
made the comparison between them and their counter
parts in the West possible thus giving them a lesson and
reason to believe that the Communist system and the
leadership produced thus was solely responsible for their
low standard of living and economic low.57
The Capitalist economies in the West had grown
stronger and thus their pace of development was sharp and
quick, Soviet people, therefore, were forced to believe that
open market economies were remedies for backwardness
and growth.58 Ronald Reagan in fact forced Soviets to such
a mad race of armament that it could not keep pace with
the West.59 Similarly the introduction of new technologies
in various other sectors defeated the conventional manu-
facturers in Soviet Union to such an extent that not to speak
of large industry, even the medium scale industry failed to
compete with the West60; say for example in the intro-
duction of various types of latest equipments in hospitals
for health sector gains.61
For more than 60 years godless Communism had
enslaved people all over the region and espoused that the
state was God, the theists lost faith on atheism and the
Communists lost control of their empire.62 Insecurity thus
became a factor for out migration of peoples living in a
country of which they suddenly found were nowhere the54 These include family restaurants, family businesses of making cloths or
handicrafts, etc.; Norman Lowe,Mastering Modern World History, p. 334.
55 Norman Lowe, Mastering Modern World History, p. 334.
56 For example, all the states of USSR were to trade in most of the things
within Communist bloc; en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_coexistence.
57 Peter J. Boettke, Why Perestroika Failed: The Politics and Economics of
Socialist Transformation, p. 47; Norman Lowe, Mastering Modern World
History, p. 335.
58 J. V. Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, pp. 46–48; Helene
M. Glaza, “Lenin’s New Economic Policy: What It Was and How It Changed
the Soviet Union”, Student Pulse: Online Academic Student Journal, Vol. I, No.
XI, available online at http://www.studentpulse.com/articles/59/lenins-
new-economic-policy-what-it-was-and-how-it-changed-the-soviet-union.
59 Cotey and Savoula Stylianou, “Friend or Foe: Why Ronald Reagan Was
Not Responsible For Ending the Cold War”, available online at www.
markville.ss.yrdsb.edu.on.ca/history/.
60 valdaiclub.com/history/26820.html
61 Nick Eberstadt, “The Health Crisis in the USSR”, International Journal
of Epidemiology, International Epidemiological Association, 2006, pp.
1384–1386.
62 Gary Notth, “Why Biblical Economics Is Ignored Today”, Biblical Eco-
nomics Today, Vol. XIII, No. V, August/September 1991, p. 2, available online at
http://www.garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/a_pdfs/newslet/bet/9108.pdf.
71 Because during the Soviet period they had beneﬁted from symbolic
privileges and status and the contrast change in such things touched
them particularly; Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, p. 6.
72 Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, p. 5.
73 Thosewhowanted to emigrate could do that in the following few years
of the independence. After that until 2006 new laws complicated the
emigration process, especially in regard to obtain citizenship in Russia. The
difﬁcult economic situation ofRussia in1990s alsocompelled someRussians
to stay in Central Asia; Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, p. 6.
74 Before Tulip Revolution of 2005 the Russian consulate of Bishkek
received 60–70 permit requests per day. However, after the Tulip Revo-
lution the consulate received 200–300 permit requests per day. For
example in 2005 Russia granted residence permits to more than 25,000
Russians of Kyrgyzstan; Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, p. 4.
75
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colonists or else as elites of Communism to various parts of
Soviet Union they felt insecure and thus out migration; as
their economic, social and political conditions became
vulnerable in the entire erstwhile Soviet Union.
3. Political reasons
As stated earlier, many of the Russian settlers had come
to various parts of the Union through several government
sponsored programmes, like the development of large
Kolkhozes (collective farms), Virgin Land Campaign of
1954, they found that from 1970s Central Asia was no
longer a region of development because the projects like
Virgin Land Campaign were abandoned.63 And at the same
time several major projects like the new railroad between
Baikal and Amur (BAM) were launched in Russia which
attracted a labour force of several hundred thousand peo-
ple,64 and accordingly many Russians started to move for
jobs to other parts of the Union. Further Leonid Brezhnev’s
policy (1970s) of indigenisation made the eponymous
population to attain the positions of power.65 Thus in 1970s
out-migrated the very ﬁrst batch of non-indigenous people
from Central Asia who were dominated by the Russians.66
And also the political conditions that evolved on the eve
of dissolution created a threat perception on various ac-
counts as well as because of the state policies that emerged
after the independence of 15 new states (besides Russian
Federation was formed). It was because from late 1980s,
due to the rise of the nationalist movement in the USSR,
Russian inﬂow in Central Asia was affected67 which also
triggered the process of emigration.68 Russians also got
scared from radical movements of religious elements that
started to surface in and around the Central Asia before and
after the fall of USSR.69 In this scenario many people
envisaged eruption of ethnic clashes and this fear forced
many to out migrate to a country of their origin.70
After the independence, the large scale migration or out
migration resulted in that Russians working mostly in
government or public administration left for Russia, the
population of natives became dominant almost in all job
sectors in each and every independent state. It therefore63 Those Russians who had come during Virgin Land Campaign or
during the last years of Soviet rule were the ﬁrst to emigrate from Central
Asia; Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, p. 2.
64 Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, p. 3.
65 Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, p. 3.
66 In 1970s Kazakhstan lost half a million people, Kyrgyzstan lost almost
100,000people, and theotherthreerepublics lost anaggregate totalof200,00
people between 1976–1980; Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, p. 3.
67 Although it was less visible in Central Asia; Ajay Patnaik, Nations,
Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 91.
68 Although these movement began before the disintegration of USSR
but they were catalyzed after 1991; Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Pa-
pers, p. 6.
69 Bakhtan Union of Democratic Youth, an association of radical in-
tellectuals fromsouthTajikistan forecasted thedangers of thegrowthof such
movements a year before Dushanbe riots of 1990. They did criticized such
movements; Ajay Patnaik,Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 98.
70 In Central Asia some ethnic riots between the titular group and the
non-Slavic groups occurred also affected their ﬂow; Ajay Patnaik, Nations,
Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 91.looked as if ethnic cleansing had taken place in public/pri-
vate sectors, administration or elsewhere and thus Russians
were reduced to non-signiﬁcant minorities (except in
Kazakhstan) in all sectors including political structures. All
these things reduced the presence of Russians in adminis-
trative, cultural and political structures in Central Asia.71
Even though all the countries in Central Asia have
adopted new constitutions that safeguard the rights of
minorities including Russians, yet it is also a case that most
of the regimes, to begin with, were authoritarian in char-
acter and nature and so Russians, already insecure on
various accounts, also feared that new regimes were not
going to help them and thus the new conditions were not
conducive for their living, as in Turkmenistan like sup-
pressing rights under dual nationality provisions.72 And
ﬁnally Russia also played its role by granting residence
permits73 to the ethnic Russians living outside Russia.74
4. Economic reasons
People generally migrate from one place to other pri-
marily for economic reasons,75 to gain better living and
improve their economic conditions.76 Same was the case
with Central Asian Russians. During the Tsarist period the
Russians came to Central Asia as military personnel and the
administrative ofﬁcials along with several peasants.77
During the Soviet period the bulk of Russian incomers in
Central Asia consisted of specialist in the industries78 andRussian out-migrate from Central Asia is reﬂected in crisis in econ-
omy due to scarcity of Russian and other non-indigenous skilled popu-
lation; Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, Anamika
Pub & Distributors, New Delhi, 2003, p. 100.
76 The states of Central Asia were relatively underdeveloped parts of the
former Soviet Union. After the disintegration of USSR these states wit-
nessed loss of subsidies and investment of capital that resulted in fall of
production and employment. For example, the economy of Tajikistan
shrank by 13% in the ﬁrst quarter of 1992 and by 20% in the second
quarter. Industry faced critical situation. Energy, chemical, food and
construction industries showed 50% decline between 1991 and 1992. All
this resulted in a mass growth of unemployment. In Kyrgyzstan almost
1000 enterprises had to close for the scarcity of raw materials; Ajay
Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, pp. 100–101.
77 Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, Woodrow Wilson Interna-
tional Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., 2008, p. 2.
78 During World War II several industries were removed from the
frontal areas and brought to Central Asia. In 1941, due to threat of Nazi
advance, as many as 1500 were moved to east of which a ﬁfth went to
Central Asia. Naturally the people involved in these industries also came
and settled down in Central Asia. Furthermore, they also attracted other
people to join them. Most of them proffered to live in the urban areas of
the region; Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, p. 2.
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and doctors who were attracted by different Soviet devel-
opmental programmes in Central Asia to occupy the posi-
tions of decision making in political, administrative and
economic sectors.79 Naturally they were mostly concen-
trated in the industrialized areas80 and the decline in this
sector hit them very hard. At the same time soon after the
disintegration of Soviet Union the standard of living in
Central Asia declined in comparison to Russia, and thus
became a good reason for Russians and other Russian
speaking population to emigrate.81 Majority of emigrants
fromKazakhstanwent to Russia. Themain reason being the
worsening economic situation and the lack of the hope for
prosperity.82 In the same way in Kyrgyzstan, economic
reasons became the main reasons for Slavs to emigrate.83
The surveys of 1990s for reasons of Russian out migration
held the lack of opportunities for the younger generations,
linguistic policies and low standard of living as the main
reasons for emigration.84
After the disintegration of Soviet Union, the whole of
Central Asia witnessed economic decline and recession
affected more the Russians as they started to get politically
marginalized in the new scenario where natives out-
numbered them in all walks of administration, public en-
terprises, and so on. This was because there was almost
negligible inﬂuence in decision making in comparison to
the past which prevented Russians to protect their eco-
nomic interests.85
In addition, the Russians in Central Asia generally were
experts in such professions which were either technical or
managerial in nature and in turn provided them a sort of
monopoly over such jobs.86 On the other hand the native
people had almost zero competition there.87 After inde-
pendence there was a shift of policy in the industrial sector
as new states preferred light and food industries for lack of
rawmaterial or for the reason of gains in the market.88 This
shift attracted the Central Asians more instead of the
Russians because their technical skill was more conducive
for such industries, whereas the Russians were mostly ex-
perts in the ﬁeld of heavy industry.89 To protect themselves79 Most of them lived in cities because of the urban nature of their
profession; Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, pp. 2–3.
80 By 1939 Uzbekistan contained 727,000 Russians (13% of the total
population), two-thirds of whom lived in cities and about 42% of them
lived in Tashkent alone; Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, p. 2.
81 Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 104;
Kazakhstan is the only exception for it experienced strong growth rates
from the beginning of 2000; Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, p. 6.
82 Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 103;
Degradation of education and ethnic preferences in employment
compelled Russians to send their children abroad (mainly Russia) for
education; Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, p. 6.
83 Between 1990 and 1996, almost 210,284 Russians left Kyrgyzstan of
which 70% emigrate were industrial workers, skilled and highly qualiﬁed
people; Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, pp.
101–104.
84 Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, p. 6.
85 Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 105.
86 Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 92.
87 Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 92.
88 Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 105.
89 Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 105.from loss of jobs and to secure bright future of their chil-
dren in education and career in Russia or elsewhere90 most
of the Russians emigrated from Central Asia.91 As for
example Uzbekistan’s Russians migrated to Kazakhstan
because the economic conditions there improved much
quickly (from the beginning of the 21st century). As a result
Kazakhstan in 2003 and 2004 received respectively 28,000
and 32,000 Russian migrants.92 A 1994 study has shown
that 41% of Russians in Uzbekistan and 39% in Kyrgyzstan
wished to emigrate from there to Russia mainly to seek
better future for their children.93 In case of Tajikistan the
economic crisis and the climate of fear created by ethnic
riots among indigenous ethnic groups resulted in large
scale emigration of Russians from Tajikistan.94
According to Scott Radnitz, economic factors were of
primary importance in motivating ethnic Russians of Cen-
tral Asia to emigrate and political factors were rarely suf-
ﬁcient to produce emigration.95 Nation-building and
nationalism inﬂuenced migration decisions only insofar as
they affected people’s material well being, by creating
language barriers and facilitating the preferential treat-
ment of locals over minorities in receiving employment.
In 1996, the states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan showed better growth indicators. At this point
of time the ﬂow of out-migration among Slavs also slowed
down.96 Tajikistan and Turkmenistan witnessed this
growth rate in 1998 which also had same implications as
above.97 These developments attest the fact that the out
migration of Russians was closely related with the eco-
nomic stability of the region they live in.98
5. Linguistic nationalisation and ethno-cultural
reasons
Soon after the independence the Central Asian states
elevated the respective native languages to the status of
state language99 giving rise to nationalism that was un-
known there in past 70 years. In this endevour a new90 Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 103.
91 Valery Tishkov, Zhanna Zayinchkovskaya and Galina Vitkovskaya,
“Migration in the countries of the former Soviet Union”, A paper prepared
for the Policy Analysis and Research Programme of the Global Commis-
sion on International Migration, September 2005, p. 2.
92 Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, p. 5.
93 Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, p. 6; According to a study in
south Kyrgyzstan 58% of the total 1800 respondents were reported to have
been thevictimsof nationalist abuse anddiscrimination, 55%hadeconomic
situation the main cause of nationalist hatred and 36% held closure of in-
dustries as themain reason, the bulk of whichwas in south of the republic;
Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 104.
94 This was also the case with Kyrgyzstan; Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Mi-
norities and States in Central Asia, p. 105.
95 Scott Radnitz, “Weighing the Political and Economic Motivations for
Migration in Post-Soviet Space: The Case of Uzbekistan”, Europe-Asia
Studies, Vol. LVIII, No. V, Taylor & Francis, Ltd., July 2006, p. 653.
96 This was also perhaps due to other measures such as protection of
their language and culture; Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in
Central Asia, p. 101.
97 Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, pp. 101–
103.
98 Which in turn is indirectly related to deterioration of inter-ethnic
conﬂicts.
99 Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 99.
106 This was due to many reasons such as ethnic discrimination in the
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guages. This new national–cultural policy heralded in
favour of the natives was a sort of nationhood and patri-
otism but the Russian minority in general felt otherwise
and feared that they were going to loose jobs as the new
policy was advantages in favour of natives.100 Promoting
the native languages and shifting the educational policy
put the Russians under tremendous pressure as hardly few
of them had any knowledge of any of the Central Asian
languages before the disintegration of USSR.
The new independent states on the other hand issued
decrees for non-natives and that stressed to hold their
posts they required to learn the native languages, as in
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, the knowledge of ofﬁcial lan-
guage was made obligatory.101 Deadlines for implementing
language requirement for posts in the state apparatus, in
administrative, economic, and cultural positions was initi-
ated in 1996 in Turkmenistan, in 1997 in Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan and in 1999 in Kyrgyzstan.102 Even though such
language laws were the reasons for out migration of Rus-
sians yet it is also true that these language laws were not
applied very effectively.103 The threat that Russians
perceived, regarding discrimination in the skilled jobs due
to language laws104 and the like, were not practically found
anywhere in Central Asia. Perhaps because the provisions
regarding language based discrimination were taken care
of by less rigid implementation of such rules/provisions
and the continued use of the Russian language for
communication and for the reasons that it jelled various
peoples across the former USSR for more than 70 years took
care of apprehension of gross discrimination.105
Even though Russian still is the second largest language
of the Central Asians today, the fear that language nation-
alism created, soon after the independence, was one of the
reasons for out migration. It was heightened fear of inter-100 Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 99; The
main cause of Russian out migration was the absence their future in
Central Asia; Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, p. 6; Ajay Patnaik,
Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 105.
101 For the posts like in the state apparatus, administrative, economic
and cultural positions; Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in
Central Asia, p. 99.
102 Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 99.
103 After the phase of nationalist euphoria, the loss of Europeans and their
impact on society and economy was realized by many political leaders
showed some kind of concern in this respect and urged the Europeans to
stay; Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 100.
104 The linguistic nationalisation in each republic gave boost to the process
of emigration. For example, inTajikistan in July 1989 afterdeclaringTajik as a
state language, 10,000 Russians left the republic. During Soviet period Rus-
sians had a very little knowledge of the native languages. A little improve-
ment in this respect was seen in 1990s. After independence attention was
paid to learn the ofﬁcial language but for the elders condition remained
unchanged.AboveallRussians regarded theCentralAsian languagesuseless.
Inonecase, representativesof the titularnationchaseoutminorities inorder
to seize their jobs and property besides the common reasons of ethnic
discomfort, communication difﬁculties, desire to live among people of one’s
own nationality, etc. of Russian emigration from Central Asia; Scott Radnitz,
“Weighing the Political and Economic Motivations for Migration in Post-
Soviet Space: The Case of Uzbekistan”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. LVIII, No. V,
p. 655; Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, pp. 5–6.
105 Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 100.ethnic conﬂicts, even if Russians were not targets, fear of
cultural alienation, religious activism, etc. and all these
fears left marks on the minds of the Russian speaking
population in Central Asia to out migrate.
Since after the fall of Soviet Union, Russians lost all the
powerandprivilegeswhichtheyenjoyedduringSovietperiod
and as a result of the change in their material wellbeing106 a
changewas also observed in their social set up. Their status in
society came down and with the passage of time the gap be-
tween them and the indigenous people widened. They
kept losing the privileged status and felt increasingly
discriminated in post-Soviet period which in turn did fuel
to the psyche of their emigration from Central Asia.107
This was in the backdrop of many cases of violent out-
bursts against Russians inmany parts of USSR in the 1980.108
Even though in Central Asia no major conﬂicts of this kind
occurred,109 in the Baltic States, the psychological factor
along with the threat of uncertainty, adoption of new lan-
guage laws, cultural and religious revivalism, etc. in thewake
of riots in Fergana110 (1989), Dushanbe111 (1990) and Osh
(1990) forced many Russians to leave Central Asia.112 Along
with the general outmigration of the Russians some internal
migrations also occurred testifying the ethno-cultural basis
of the emigration. In 1990s, for example, the ethnic Russians
migrated from Kazakh dominated areas of southern and
western part of the Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to the Slavic
areas in the northern Kazakhstan.113 Likewise ethnic Rus-
sians migrated from Uzbekistan only after Fergana Riots in
1989. As a consequence of the chaotic conditions created by
the Fergana ethnic conﬂict, almost half of the Russians
(800,000 people) out migrated from 1991 to 2006.114ﬁelds of employment and the like.
107 Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 99.
108 Foe example in Tajikistan there were attempts to provoke anti-Russia
outbursts and use of violence against Russians; K. Warikoo, Cockpit of Cen-
tral Asia:Afghanistan Factor inTajikistan’sCrisis,Kashmir InformationNetwork,
available online at http://www.kashmir-information.com/afghanistan/index.
html.
109 During the Dushanbe riots in 1990, the primary target was the ruling
establishment but in the process some Russians also encountered in-
cidents of assaults and intimidation; Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and
States in Central Asia, pp. 93–94.
110 Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 93; It
took place in 1989 in Fergana Valley between Uzbeks and Meskhetian
Turks. In this conﬂict almost 100 lives were lost and 100,000 people
including 74,000 Meskhetian Turks left their homes for other Soviet re-
publics. Turkmenistan was the only stable state in Central Asia where the
Russians did not felt any fear of ethnic unrest or economic pressure; Ajay
Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, p. 99.
111 In July 1989 Tajik language was formally elevated to the status of
national ofﬁcial language. This triggered the ﬁrst ﬂow of Russian
emigration from Tajikistan. As a result in February 1990 there occurred
violent confrontations in Dushanbe.
112 In 1990 asmanyas 200,000 non-indigenous specialists left Central Asia.
FromOsh, 32,000 Slavs left the region immediately after the outbreak of the
riots; Ajay Patnaik, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia, pp. 39–94.
113 The southern and northern Kazakhstan contained mainly ethnic
Kazakhs; Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, pp. 3–4.
114 According to a research more than 500,000 Russians deserted the
country between 1990 and 1997, while as other research held that as
many as 75,000 (approximately 5%) Russians left the country per year in
1990s; Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, p. 5.
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were still 380,000 Russians in the country, but in 1993
alone 200,000 Russians (that is half of the remained) leftthe republic.115 Those who remained were the elderly who
had no means to leave, who belonged to ethnically mixed
families and who could not obtain necessary documents.116115 Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, p. 5.
116 Sebastien Peyrouse, Occasional Papers, p. 5.
